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This research focuses on the operations of the Royal Company of the Philippines in the 
global market, in particular on the slave trade between Africa and Spanish America, as a 
way to examine the local dimensions of global trade. It identifies the causes and 
consequences of a failed venture that, despite its failure, opened a new cycle in the Río 
de la Plata slave trade and its place in the global economy of the late eighteenth century. 
 
Keywords:  Labor and consumers; Latin America; Buenos Aires; Business History; 
Royal Company of Philippines; slave trade.  
 
The problem: the local scale of global commerce of the enslaved 
The study of African and Afro descendants’ slavery in the Río de la Plata has a long 
tradition. Indeed, since the 1950s attention has been drawn to the early entry of slaves 
into the region, who were supposed to fill the absence of the indigenous workforce, 
stimulate the internal market, and boost long-distance trade.1 
New research on the volume, origins and introduction of enslaved workers, 
based on the work of Alex Borucki and the “Slave voyages” database, has provided 
more robust data for assessing the role of slavery in the Río de la Plata economy.2  
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In terms of the total volume of the slave trade, the number of enslaved workers 
in this region was marginal compared with the larger Atlantic world, but it had a 
significant impact on the local economies where slaves carried out various activities, 
ranging from domestic labor and agriculture to animal husbandry. Slaves were, 
furthermore, a medium of exchange for trade with Lima and the Alto Peru region, 
making their care and export particularly important.3  
The Spanish Crown itself, however, did not directly manage or operate the slave 
trade, due both to its inability to compete with foreign companies and to reduce 
smuggling; therefore, it chose a policy of slave trade contracts (asientos) from the late 
sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century. Finally, within the framework of the 
new regulations on free trade (Comercio Libre), licenses were granted to individuals, 
first Spanish and later on foreigners, leading to the formation of companies dedicated to 
the direct importation of Africans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
This essay focuses on an exceptional case run, “by means of trial,” by the Royal 
Company of the Philippines (RCP) which, through royal permissions, tried to carry out 
a triangular trade in European goods, enslaved Africans, American silver, and East 
Asian merchandise.4 The episode attests to the complex and intricate remaking of 
Spanish trade across its empire, an empire segmented by corporative prohibitions, fiscal 
barriers and local interests.  While these obstacles to freer trade significantly decreased 
the King’s income, they gave cohesion to imperial governance.5 
The attempt at change, in this case through the royal concession granted to a 
private company of monarchical interest, underlines Spanish commercial dependency 
on its British counterpart, the incompetence of the Crown’s bureaucracy, as well as the 
strength of local colonial interests. Moreover, the failure of the enterprise illuminates 
the obsolescence of the monopoly, the fragility of the Company’s management system, 
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and the power of local actors. I am therefore interested in exploring and assessing the 
local conditions of global trafficking.6  
 
Privileges and failures of a slaver company 
On 7 September 1789, Don Martín de Sarratea, representative for the Royal Company 
of the Philippines in Buenos Aires, addressed a petition to the Viceroy, requesting that 
the Royal Company be exempted from the payment of the first-sale alcabala (sale tax) 
to the enslaved “led from Africa,” at its account and risk, according to the privilege 
granted by the Real cédula (royal decree) of 28 February 1789.  The concession referred 
to a new trade policy through which the Crown withdrew the granting of slave trade 
contracts to foreign companies, replacing it with the newly created Philippines 
Company, thereby creating a new model of direct navigation between Africa and the 
Río de la Plata “by means of trial.”7  
As Fernando Jumar and Alex Borucki have shown, there were three phases in 
the Río de la Plata trafficking from 1680 to 1780, namely: the French asiento between 
1701 and 1712; the English asiento from 1713 to 1739 and, as a continuity, the long 
Portuguese presence in the Colonia de Sacramento, stretching from 1680 to 1777.8 With 
Viceroy Cevallos’ eviction of the Portuguese from Colonia and the formation of the 
Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, the RCP and other Spanish subjects noticed the 
opportunity to take control of the slave trade to Spanish America, which, either on their 
own or in partnership with foreign investors, promised substantial profits.9  
           A previous, failed attempt to take control over direct trafficking through the 
islands of Fernando Po and Annobon in the Gulf of Guinea relinquished by the 
Portuguese in the Treaty of San Idelfonso, had been costly in resources and lives. Had it 
been successful, this sally would have allowed the embarkation of enslaved Africans 
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from a Spanish port in Africa (factoría) and would have opened up a triangular trade 
between Cádiz and the African coast with South America and with the Philippines.10 
The Philippines Company expeditions took place in the interim years between the 
taking of Colonia and the opening of the Río de la Plata market to individuals, both 
nationals and foreigners, in 1791. However, as Borucki has shown, the Portuguese in 
Brazil continued to dominate the African slave trade, as they supplied 60 percent of the 
laborers that forcibly entered through the ports of the Río de la Plata from 1777 to 
1812.11 
As Elena F.S. de Studer has explained in her classical study, the Bourbon 
strategy allowed the granting of licenses to individuals for the trade of enslaved 
Africans within the framework of the Comercio Libre policy (1789 to 1791).12 
However, until that moment, it had not been possible to reconcile the interests of the 
King with the expectations of the local American-based merchants, hence the decision 
to privilege the Royal Company of the Philippines.13 In this context, this study will 
examine, through the RCP, the agency of local actors in the traffic, in order to explain 
why the RCP failed, as well as the consequences for future slave trading and the 
inherent contradictions of the RCP’s strategy.  
 
Business “by means of trial”: enslaved Africans, partners and losses 
The representative of the Royal Company of the Philippines in Buenos Aires, when 
assessing the new initiative, described the following in the footnote of a table that 
testified to the failure of the slave trade venture:  
 
In the preceding accounting – Estado – it is provable that, of the 2833 slaves that 
the nominated vessels took from Bonny, 656 died at sea; and that, having the 
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Captains delivered 2177 including 3 found in Montevideo to have traveled 
furtively, 509 died in that place and in this capital [Buenos Aires], which, 
merged with the former, compose the number [of dead slaves] of 1165. Of the 
residual 1668 slaves, I dispatched 1073 to Lima and 594 were sold here and in 
Montevideo, their verified sale producing 161772 pesos, resting one more 
[unsold] due to being old and ailing.14  
 
The testimony summarizes the market structures, the logic of the trafficking, and the 
costs that a failed slave trade venture had for the Company; a venture which, 
nevertheless, brought benefits to the global and local actors of trafficking. 
Five components can be identified in Sarratea’s description, namely: 1. The 
process of “production of the slave,” materialized in the “appropriation and delivery” 
carried out by African traders, and their transportation on the “nominated vessels,” 
belonging to a British global company; 2. The “delivery” by the “Captains” inasmuch as 
it was an Atlantic navigation company, subject to loading and unloading rules that 
implied “losses and contingencies,” which translated into deaths; 3. The contraband of 
enslaved workers “who came furtively,” who upon arrival became items of commerce 
and found an outlet on the market; 4. The internación or slave trade to the Andean 
region all the way to Lima, which was the provider of specie and the engine of the 
global circulation of the enslaved and, finally; 5. The balances of the slave market, 
which responded to a price structure based on the expected utility in relation to the age 
and the potential uses of those held captive, in concurrence with the demand effect: the 




These are the keys by which I explain the role of a mixed imperial venture, the 
Philippines Company, driven by the interests both of the King and of individuals in a 
monopolistic model that showed its limitations early on, related both to its competitive 
inabilities and to market failures.15 Through this observation, I explore these statements 
– as a stylization of a historical process and in a specific moment – and into the position 
of the actors, witnesses and agents of the interests embedded in the slave trade in the 
Río de la Plata.16  
When the Philippines Company decided to connect Cadiz with the Western coast 
of Africa, the coast of Coromandel in India and the Philippines with the coast of 
Canton, using American silver as the lever of global business, their global market 
project linked  two routes that were to be complementary: the first, forcefully bringing 
Africans to Spanish America, first to  Buenos Aires and then from Mendoza to Chile, 
continuing on  from the port of Valparaiso to Lima; the second, carrying silver to the 
East and bringing commodities that were to be financed during the first leg of the 
route.17  
The circulation model that connected the Spanish American routes of the South 
Atlantic with the western coast of Africa was the goal of the partnership between the 
Company and British slave traders, an exercise both in learning and in military cunning 
to avoid the uncertainties of a sea ravaged by corsairs and enemy warships.18 
To this effect, this Spanish company entered into a contract with the Baker & Dawson 
Company – an old acquaintance that was already transporting enslaved people to the 
Spanish Caribbean – to acquire two of James McTaggart’s ships from the port of 
Bristol. The ships would embark enslaved Africans and then make the Atlantic voyage 
towards Spanish American ports on the account and risk of the Philippines Company, 
sailing first with a British flag to freely roam the seas and a Spanish one upon entry into 
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the Rio de la Plata.19 Another three ships were acquired in London from Fermen de 
Tastet (also known as Fermín de Tastet) to make the journey to Bonny (Africa) and 
carry slaves to Montevideo.20   
The “Prince” or “Príncipe” – as it was called in Buenos Aires – was a 273-ton 
vessel, armed with six cannons and recently built in Bristol (1785), where it was 
registered as a slave ship (1787). The vessel set out sailing with a British flag in the 
same port on 28 July 1787, arriving in Buenos Aires waving a Spanish flag on 25 
October 1788 under the command of Captain James Clurg and with a crew of 34 sailors. 
It had started with 427 Africans, but only disembarked 355 since 72 perished during the 
journey, a 17 percent mortality rate.21 The ship “Princesa” was a 259-ton ship with four 
mounted weapons, built in Bristol (1779) and registered in the same place on the eve of 
its departure for Bonny, on 28 July 1787. There, it forcibly loaded 421 people, though 
only 350 arrived in Buenos Aires, 71 having died on the journey, again with a mortality 
rate of 17 percent. Its crew consisted of 27 sailors under the orders of Captain Charles 
Sloper.22 Once unloaded, these ships returned with local products to Santander in July 
1788, on their journey back to Bristol. The British company closed its business with the 
chartering of the ships and the delivery of the cargo, apparently leaving the business.  
Three other British ships crossed the Atlantic with the English flag and 
conducted by Fermen de Tastet’s company, arriving in the Río de la Plata under Spanish 
flag and carrying slaves for the Royal Company of the Philippines.23 Another ship, built 
in Liverpool in 1784 and bought in London in 1788, was “Spanified” for further 
navigation.24 The first arrivals, on 1 September 1788, docked in Montevideo carrying 
688 slaves, having embarked 1,072 in Africa and losing 384 in the journey. The 
business had been devastated by the death of so many Africans. In some cases, the 
mortality averages doubled from the conventional rate, as it will be shown below. The 
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first to arrive was the Elizabeth, alias “El Indiano,” commanded by Thomas Wallace. It 
was a new 240-ton ship, built in Stockton (1785) and registered in London, which began 
its sailing on 7 April 1788, in route to Bonny, where it forcibly shipped 470 people, 
disembarking in Montevideo with 241 slaves, and having 229 African deaths during the 
journey, that is, almost half (49 percent). Its captain returned to London after almost a 
year’s journey, on 17 May 1789.25 That same day, another vessel under the alias of “El 
Africano” arrived in Montevideo. It was a ship lower in tonnage (373), built in the 
shipyards of Hull (1782) and registered for sailing in London (1788), where it began its 
voyage to Bonny on 11 May 1788, commanded by Captain John Smith and having 
forcefully shipped 602 enslaved on the African coast, of which 155 perished during the 
journey, a death rate of 26 percent.  The last ship, owned by Fermen de Tastet and 
leased by the Philippines Company, called “La Favorita,” with capacity of up to 225 
tons and under the command of Captain Joseph Banfield, forcefully carried 466 
enslaved people off New Calabar, between 12 August 1788 and 12 February  1789, of 
which 393 arrived alive and 73 died during the journey, a mortality rate of 16 percent. 
The vessel returned to London, now as the “Favourite” in September 1788. The balance 
of the agreement with Tastet’s company was particularly disastrous, with 457 enslaved 
Africans lost in the high seas over the 1,538 shipped, averaging a 30 percent in 
mortality losses. At the time, the average mortality rate of slave voyages varied between 
12 and 17 percent.26   
In addition to the arrivals chartered by the Royal Company there was a 
“Spanified” British vessel, also named “Elizabeth,” built in Liverpool in 1784 and 
bought in London in 1788, shipping on 27 May under the command of John Marshall in 
route to Bonny, where it forcibly loaded 546 enslaved Africans, of which 388 arrived 
9 
 
alive in Montevideo on 1 September less 158 who died aboard, a rate of 29 percent, 
with no difference regarding the average of the rest of the commissions.27  
The Company of Bristol undertook ten transatlantic voyages with enslaved 
workers in the period stretching from 1773 to 1788. During this period, it loaded 3,112 
slaves and it disembarked 2,682, with a death rate of 14 percent for its voyages, mainly 
women (52 percent) and children (24 percent). Their routes were circumscribed in the 
British Caribbean circuit – that is, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenada – 
and the last two bound for Buenos Aires. Their extraction areas were Bight of Biafra, 
the Bight of Benin, and the Gold Coast. In this case, all arriving to Río de la Plata came 
from the Bight of Biafra.  
It is interesting to note that the Company of Bristol is the one that best fulfilled 
its mission, with lower costs and shorter journeys. In contrast, the most relevant cost fell 
on the negotiations with Fermen de Tastet, due perhaps to the mismanagement of the 
captains of his vessels. This persuaded the RCP that trafficking on behalf of third parties 
would not yield the greatest benefit in the Río de la Plata when compared to the 
Portuguese traders and those who managed the supply and prices of slaves on their own.  
The report that Sarratea presented to the Board (Junta de Gobierno) of the RCP testifies 
to the losses at sea and land, the sale and remission, as well as an estimate of the net 







TABLE 1: Net number of movements of slaves from boarding in Boni to remission 
to Lima and Income per Capita28 
Note: (*) “tres recaudados en Montevideo de estas expediciones”. 
Source: “Estado general que manifiesta el numero de piezas de Esclavos que cargaron en Boni 
las fragatas nombradas Príncipe, Princesa, Indiano,, Africano, Favorita y Elisavet (sic) de Cuenta 
de la R(ea)l Compañía de Filipinas: los que entregaron en Montevideo; muertos en la navegación, 
en d(ic)ha plaza y esta Capital; su venta; remisión con destino a Lima, existencia; total de los que 
me hice cargo y valor de los vendidos.”AGNA, Colonia/Gobierno/Hacienda, IX 33-6-1 (2878) 
 
Land mortality is the most significant, since it represented 77 percent of navigation 
deaths when the hardships increased due to diseases, mistreatment or lack of adequate 
living spaces. Deaths on land, for their part, showed deficiencies in the infrastructure 
and an incapacity to guarantee the recovery of the Africans’ health, as well as a poor 
management of trafficking from the port of quarantine, Montevideo, to the port of sale: 
dysentery was lethal for the newly arrived, but so were depression, suicides, and 
cultural and physical violence inflicted by the slave companies.29  
An initial conclusion points to the numbers of lost lives, both at sea and on land, 
as a cause of failure of the venture. Yet, a closer examination of the performance of 
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427 355 72 
       
Princesa Carlos 
Sloper 
421 350 71 
       
SUM 
 





470 241 229 
       
Africano Juan 
Smith 
602 447 155 
       
Favorita José 
Banfield 
466 393 73 
       
Elizabeth Juan 
Marshall 
446 388 58 
       
SUM 
 










each ship allows some additional observations. The first contract, which loaded 30 
percent of the enslaved workers boarded at Bonny, had an average of sea losses of 
around 20 percent over the total delivered: Clough and Sloper fulfilled what was 
expected. The second consignment – which accounted for 70 percent of the business – 
performed more poorly, since the losses at sea were on average a third of those 
delivered. Here, the catastrophe that was the navigation of Wallace’s Indiano stands out: 
only half of those who were loaded in Africa were delivered in Montevideo, and the 
losses were almost of 50 percent before reaching land. 
 






DEAD AT  SEA/ 
DELIVERED 
Príncipe James Clourgh 15.1% 83.1% 17 % 20.3% 
Princesa Charles Sloper 15 % 83.1% 17 % 20.3% 
SUM 
 
30.0% 83.1% 17 % 20.3% 
Indiano Thomas Wallace 16.6% 51.3% 48.7% 95.0% 
Africano Jhon Smith 21.3% 74.3% 25.7% 34.7% 
Favorita Joseph Banfield 16.4% 84.7% 15.3% 18.1% 
Elizabeth John Marshall 15.8% 87.0% 13.0% 15 % 
SUM 
 
70.0% 74.3% 26 % 35 % 
TOTAL 
 
100% 77 % 17 % 20.3% 
 
TABLE 2. Number of slaves boarded at Boni in ships belonging to the Real 
Compañía de Filipinas, arrived at Rio de la Plata, 1785-178630 
Source: AGNA, Colonia/Gobierno/Hacienda, IX 33-6-1 (2878) 
 
At this point, the information allows me to draw some conclusions that highlight the 
variable luck of partnerships undertaken by the RCP. From the contract with the Baker 
& Dawson Company, using James McTaggart ships, the results were, according to 
Studer, relatively acceptable: there was a 32 percent mortality in navigation, 705 having 
arrived at the port of Montevideo, of which 326 were sold in that venue and 195 were 
sent to Lima and Chile. Of the 541 that were successfully sold, the RCP obtained 
88,850 pesos, at a net average of 164 pesos per slave.31 However, in the second 
contract, aboard vessels chartered in London and Liverpool, 1,985 enslaved workers 
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were loaded in Bonny and 1,472 were delivered in the Río de la Plata, of which 1,126 
are estimated to have been sold: 268 in Buenos Aires and 858 sent to Lima. The 
Company reported an income from its 72,922 pesos sale, at a net average of 64 pesos 
and 6 reales per capita. In his communication to the Company’s Board on 4 July 4 
1791, Sarratea estimated a loss of 105,078 pesos for the death of 656 enslaved workers, 
at an average rate of 160 pesos and 1 real per African.32  
The foregoing points to high operation costs since the value of the slaves’ lives 
decreases in proportion to the increase in their price in relative terms, most notably in 
the second contract, when the company recovered barely 60 percent per capita in 
comparison to the first contract. Yet, in a closer examination it is also possible to 
observe the serious consequences of mismanagement on land, in addition to the losses 
at sea, since almost a quarter of the enslaved arrived in the ports and their effective sales 
were lost. Here, net estimates of the failed business in the Río de la Plata can be made, 
since only in the first contract 46 percent of the arrived were sold, and another 10 














Delivered Sent to 
Lima/ 
delivered  
Clourgh/Sloper 10.6% 12.6% 23.3% 46.2% 32.4% 30.5% 
Wallace/Smith 
Banfield/Marshall 
18.3% 5.2% 23.5% 10.2% 67.6% 58.3% 
TOTAL 15.8% 7.6% 23.4% 27.3%  49.3% 
TABLE 3. Slaves dead, sold, and sent to Lima in relation to those arrived in 
Montevideo in ships belonging to the Real Compañía de Filipinas, 1786-178833 
Source: AGNA, Colonia/Gobierno/Hacienda, IX 33-6-1 (2878) 
 
Slave mortality was a factor in the failure of the venture since 41 percent of the captives 
died during transfer and acclimatization, considering that 2,830 enslaved workers were 
embarked and 2,174 were delivered, 656 having perished at sea, in addition to 344 more 
in Montevideo and 165 in Buenos Aires.34  
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According to the accounting records, 594 were sold in the ports and 1073 were 
sent to Lima through the western route that went to Mendoza, Santiago and Valparaiso. 
Of the first consignment of 907 enslaved workers sent to Lima, 27 died during transit, 
thus only 880 slaves were sold at a total of 322,080 pesos, at an average price of 366 
pesos per capita (ppc). The transfer costs totaled 13.3 percent of the effective sale – 
equivalent to 42,382 pesos, while human losses, considering the average sale price, 
totaled 9,882 pesos. 
On the other hand, those who were sold in Buenos Aires and Montevideo added 
89,387 pesos in revenue for the RCP: $61,739 from the enslaved sold in the first 
contract and $27,649 from the 111 enslaved sold in the second contract. The average 
price reached 202 pesos per capita, but the variance between the first (187 pesos per 
capita) and second contract (249 pesos per capita) represented a 33 percent increase 
driven by the cost of losses of the second contract.  
The representative of the Philippines Company in Buenos Aires estimated, in his 
communication to the RCP on 4 July 1791, a loss of 105,078 pesos for the death of 656 
enslaved workers, at an average rate of 160 pesos and 1 real.35 If the sale price of the 
enslaved is adjusted with Sarratea’s estimates, the divergence between the RCP’s 
accounting and its factor is 26 percent, while the price hike between the first (+17 
percent) and second contracts (+55 percent) and the sale in Lima (+128 percent), shows 
that, even if the business of taking slaves from Africa to Lima was a failure for the 
Company, the greatest benefit went to the merchants of Buenos Aires and their inland 
associates.36  
In 1784, 1,069 enslaved workers entered Lima by sea but, between the years of 
1786 and 1789, the entry of slaves fell by half to 534, causing an increase in demand, 
from which the dispatch of slaves from Buenos Aires surely benefited.37 An estimate 
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over price sales in Lima between 1783 and 1789, based on the records of José Antonio 
Lavalle, show price levels between 480 to 550 pesos for men and 380 to 400 pesos for 
women.38 In Lima, the Conde de San Isidro, one of the largest shareholders of the 
Company and resident in the city, was the one who received the preference of the 
factores – commercial representatives – and the advantages of prices, having in 1789 
acquired a total of 140 slaves dispatched by the Company in his vessel, named “San 
Juan Nepomuceno,” from Valparaiso.39 
After 1791, trafficking in Buenos Aires returned to individual initiative, national 
and foreign, making way for the more dynamic cycle of the entry of enslaved workers, 
both by the Portuguese of Brazil who brought the enslaved from Bahia and Río de 
Janeiro, and from the African coast by merchants of the Río de la Plata, Brazil, and the 
United States.  
The second shareholder of the Company in the Rio de la Plata, Antonio de 
Letamendi, confided to his partner in Cordoba (inland Argentina), Ambrosio Funes, 
who was also committed to the business of introducing enslaved workers, the following 
diagnosis of the situation:   
 
The Negroes still maintain their high price at 270–280 Spanish pesos, but with 
the many that have arrived, and who will not be sent to Chile, it follows that in 
this winter we will have more equity.40 
 
A month later, Letamandi informed Funes in another letter that expectations had 
changed, thanks to the effect of the “invernada” (wintering) and the direct trade that 




Negroes are in abundance, but their price is not declining: In this winter it is 
believed that they will be much cheaper, because some expeditions that have 
departed from here to bring them from the coasts of Africa are still to come: If 
this were to happen, of course, it was a business that promised utility, selling 
them to Peru in spring after the wintering here.41 
 
For the people of the Río de la Plata, the logic of trade was buying low and selling high, 
something the Company was not able to understand on a global dimension; it 
considered that the instruments of fiscal privilege and the monopoly would be enough to 
penetrate the local market in Buenos Aires, lower the costs of entry and to finance their 
business in East Asia with Spanish American silver obtained from the “infamous trade.” 
They were mistaken. 
 
The organization of the business and its results 
The privilege granted to the Royal Company of the Philippines for trafficking in South 
America, as I have described, was committed to generating capital that would provide 
liquidity to trade with the East. The Company’s goal, as Borucki has pointed out, had its 
interest set on seizing tax revenue in Buenos Aires and Lima, which would later be used 
in negotiations in the Philippines.42 
This global business model, based on shipping enslaved workers to America and 
on taking American silver to East Asia, implied that the organization was necessarily 
subjected to a complex chain of wills. The first will was, naturally, the “royal favor” 
and, later on, the acquiescence of the Assembly of Shareholders (Asamblea de 
accionistas) run by Minister Soler in agreement with the Conde de Galvez in Madrid. In 
its internal structure, the board – which responded to the Assembly of Shareholders, or 
Junta de accionistas – reached agreement on all important decisions with Soler and 
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enforced them through their representatives in various loading and unloading points, in 
this case in Buenos Aires, Lima and Manila.  
Among its duties, the Board (Junta de Gobierno) had to present account 
statements by transaction and by localities, attending to the reports of their 
representatives. But the case at hand must have seriously concerned the shareholders 
and Martin Antonio de Huizi, promoter for the business in London, was asked to 
prepare a balance of the “black trading account,” in 1789.43 
The general balance of 30 September of that year showed a state of losses of 
2,100,156 reales de vellón and 22 maravedíes, around 105,008 Spanish pesos. This 
included not only the deficit of slaves lost at sea and on land, but specifically the 
engineering that involved the deployment of resources and actors to mobilize the 
institutional apparatus, the partners and the employees, the seamen, the stranded costs of 
a company without a sufficient fleet of its own, without competent personnel, and 
enmeshed in a dense net of relationships with local actors, which privatized the benefits 
and transferred the losses to the RCP.  
I focus on three internal elements to understand the failure of the “slave trade 
sally” in the Río de la Plata: first, the cost of navigation as a proportion of the expected 
and actual profits through the sale of enslaved people; second, the logistics chain of the 
management of trafficking, from the partnership with British merchants to operating 
expenses in the local scale of the transfer and sale of enslaved people; third, the stranded 
costs of the shipping operation and the fiscal pressure brought on by  prolonged and 
costly negotiations with local American actors. In Huizi’s accounting, the result shows a 
liability of “balance by loss” that barely reached 18 percent of the difference between 
the Debit and Credit columns. This accounting was designed to buffer the net impact of 
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the losses in the company’s finances, where what mattered most were the arguments in 
favor of the expected profits in future ventures.  
An examination of the categories of expenses, separated from the returns, may 
help to establish a different margin of losses and their possible causes: firstly, the global 
navigation cost should be considered, trying to distinguish the two contracts separately 
and a total estimation; secondly, the series of expenses associated to the logistical chain 
and its stranded costs should be considered; thirdly, the number and value of the sold 
slaves must be computed according to Huizi’s estimates of  the business as a whole.  
An inspection of the categories of navigation, using the distinctions given by the 
sources, shows that the cost of the ships considering their charter, habilitation, rancho 
(provisions) expenses and cargo effects, added up to 67,645 British pounds, equivalent 
to 500,022 Spanish pesos: 60 percent corresponded to “cargo effects,” which are not 
specified as their own. The ships also transported cargo and operational resources for 
the Spanish Crown, which did not generate proceeds, but constituted a political 
obligation due to the benefits and privileges that had been granted.44 
In net terms the cost of the fleet added up to 210,247 Spanish pesos: $83,011 for 
the cost of six ships, $107,012 for their habilitation and rancho – provisions – in 
addition to $20,195 for management expenses of the venture. Shipping, according to 
Huizi, entailed other additional operating expenses equivalent to 17,864 pesos, divided 
among many categories: 1. “Préstamos y gastos de los individuos españoles en 
Londres” [Loans and expenses of Spanish individuals in London]; 2. Corretajes, portes 
de cartas y sellos de letras en Londres” [Brokerage, bill of lading shipping charges, and 
letter seals in London], 3. “Por asignaciones pagadas en San Sebastián y Cádiz de los 
individuos españoles que fueron en estas Expediciones” [Allowances paid in San 
Sebastián and Cadiz to Spanish individuals who went in these trips]; 4. “Por Bestuario 
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(sic) y otras provisiones remitidas desde la Coruña a Buenos Aires” [Clothing and other 
provisions sent from La Coruña to Buenos Aires]. 
The first category included the expenses of the Spanish officials and sailors sent 
to Britain with the purpose of becoming involved in the knowledge of navigation, since 
they would be in charge of future Spanish slave voyages. These were the men who 
would receive stipends for their performance on the travels, which could be considered 
as costs of apprenticeship (costos de instrucción).  
More interesting are the costs associated with the financial management of the 
expeditions, since the RCP was forced to resort to a simulated issuance of debt, 
operating as a company financed from Madrid but involved in the circulation of 
securities in London. Hence, the expenses for brokerage and acknowledgement of debt 
were relevant to expectations for the success of the venture.  
The value of the load represented 58 percent of the total amount that was 
executed in the set of contracts: 39,202 British pounds, equivalent to an estimate of 
289,775 Spanish pesos. On this basis, expenses were accumulated in the habilitation and 
rancho – provisions – of the ships (21 percent), while extra expenses (4 percent) totaled 
more than ten million reales de vellón, equivalent to over 500,000 Spanish pesos.45 
These were the calculations presented by Huizi to inform the shareholders.  
Additionally, other operating expenses show the financial management of the 
venture: 105,554 Spanish pesos were added for items ranging from loans and expenses 
on the way from London to Buenos Aires ($38,171) to stopover and unloading expenses 
in Cadiz ($1387), Montevideo ($23,729), and in “disassembling and adjustment” in 
Cádiz and at the end of the journey ($42,267). The total costs of the venture had risen to 
685,025 Spanish pesos, equivalent to more than thirteen million reales de vellón.  
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The accountants of the Company were only able to cover a sale total for 126,135 
Spanish pesos: $89,387 from the sale of slaves, 70 percent of which correspond to the 
first sale and the rest to the second one, which turned out to be disastrous. The freight 
recovery of 14,238 pesos represented just over 11 percent, and a load of pelts sold in 
London accounted for 12 percent of the Company’s income. If this was so then, as of 30 
September 1790, 25 percent of the original investment had been recovered.  
A confidential report to the Spanish Finance Minister clearly reveals the 
problems with the business model, questioning both its aims and its results and, 
specifically, the debts to the Real Hacienda over amounts advanced and unfulfilled 
taxes:  
 
As the Company needed funds in Lima and Buenos Aires, the Direction thought 
that the exclusive commerce of blacks for Peru and the provinces of the Rio de 
la Plata would be an efficient way to acquire them. The King agreed if this were 
to be a trial so that the Nation could over time make this direct commerce from 
the coasts of Africa. The Permit was issued requesting an economy regarding the 
sale of Negroes a costo y costas, demanding an exact account to present to the 
Ministry justified with the respective collection of its consignments taken by the 
Superintendents or Royal Ministries of America. The expeditions would be 
carried from the ports of Spain in national vessels. The Direction later obtained a 
license to buy the vessels and dispatch them from their ports to sell peso fuerte 
por sencillo [value peso for nominal peso] at the price that was calculated and 
marked by the respective Superintendents of the Royal Treasure and the 
commissioners of the Company, setting the approximate calculation al costo y 
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costas. Also, it was granted that four of the six expeditions that were made to 
Buenos Aires returned with freight to the ports of England.46 
 
As noted earlier, the contracts were disadvantageous, the handling of the “merchandise” 
was messy, the infrastructure was inappropriate, the management and cost of British 
financing was expensive, as were the navigation and liquidation costs, the port sales 
were inconsistent, and the forceful transfer of people was advantageous only for the 
local merchants in Buenos Aires and further inland. From the viewpoint of the Ministry 
of the Royal Treasure (Ministerio de Real Hacienda), the business model – paid at its 
expenses and without any fiscal return – was disastrous for the King’s finances:  
 
There have been no savings. The Negroes have been of very bad quality and 
have been sold at excessive prices. All the political goals of the Ministry have 
been frustrated. Nothing of what was stipulated was achieved. The Royal 
Treasure has not been reimbursed for the supplements that had been made to the 
Company in Lima and Buenos Aires as it was offered by the Direction with the 
sales product of the Negroes, on the contrary it [the Royal Treasure] is owed the 
rights of these [sales] and of the returns that ascend to 72,432 pesos.47 
 
Thus, it is possible to return to the starting point. The dispute between the Real 
Hacienda and the Philippines Company revolved around the tax privileges and the 
exemption of taxes, but it also involved the monopoly on sales and its insolvency to 
comply with the charges made to the King’s finances in the Royal Treasury (Reales 
Cajas) of Buenos Aires and Lima. These were issues that were not settled until years 
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later. At any rate, slave trafficking on behalf of the Company had a premature end. The 
conclusion of the confidential report to the Finance Minister was definitive:  
 
It is said however that the Direction [of the RCP, AI] undertook this commerce 
driven by the Ministry to contribute to its goals and administration. 
Administration without fulfilling any of the conditions of its permit and trial 
dispatching of course six expeditions in which ten million were spent, are two 
things that are not understood.48 
 
Conclusions 
Enmeshed in an imperial logic of trafficking, this episode testifies to the complexities 
and disruptions of the global strategy adopted by the Royal Company of the Philippines 
and, more clearly, the obsolescence of monopolistic practices which had dominated 
trade with Spanish America from the 1590s to 1780s. After the imperial rearrangement 
of the Seven Years’ War, the moment of commercial globalization throughout the world 
showed Spanish decline, British hegemony and the repositioning of actors in the 
Americas who were in the control of global businesses on a local scale.  
The nature of the slave trade market, imposed by British control over the sale 
and shipment of slaves in the transatlantic world and demand of forced labor on 
plantations (particularly in the Caribbean) as well as the irruption of Anglo–Americans 
and their plantations into the business, led to the end of price regulation through the 
competitive advantages of the monopoly.49 The episode is particularly meaningful for 
the Río de la Plata, since it shows the changes within an era and in the sense of the 




The Philippines Company showed its shortcomings in the organization of 
trafficking, the financing of shipping, the lack of infrastructure and the high costs of 
provisioning, in crew remuneration and in the negotiations with British ship-owners and 
shipping companies. Mortality at sea and on land did not compensate for the 
investments, nor did sales and the prices of the internal slave trade to Lima; instead, this 
operation transferred the benefits to the local market and to American logistics. In short, 
the failure of the venture is an eloquent episode revealing the complexity of the global 
market on a local level, testifying at the same time to the archaism of privilege: a new 
era in business made the efforts to preserve monopolistic practices costly at a time when 
the benefits of free trade were increasingly manifest. 
In his defense of the Philippines Company’s privilege, Sarratea made rhetorical 
arguments which had been already been presented to the King to authorize the venture 
and facilitate its financing with resources from the Real Hacienda in order to omit 
sanctions and avoid bankruptcy: 
 
Which graces and which freedoms are not presumable in favor of the Royal 
Company that made its first attempts at its own cost, with six large expeditions 
in times in which it lacked the knowledge that are acquired with practice and 
experience?   […] it was the first and only that risked its assets in the draft of 
Negroes, the one that, at the expense of immense losses, served as stimulus to 
other nationals and that, therefore, has better backings to expect a total liberation 
of fees.50 
 
This was the stance Sarratea maintained for more than a decade in the dispute with Juan 
José Núñez, administrator of the Royal custom office in Buenos Aires, since Sarratea 
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requested the exemption of duties in September 1789, up until September 1800, when 
he won the conflict. The royal decree confirmed the privilege of exemption to the RCP 
and the validity of the benefits granted to the trafficking of the enslaved, in addition to 
ordering the return of forty thousand pesos, pawned as a security bond for the payment 
of taxes, closing the institutional chapter of a commercial failure in 1800.  
The local actors who staged a legal fight backed by their corporate 
representations – the Real Hacienda and the RCP – concluded a series of confrontations 
that involved Viceroy Arredondo, the Tribunal de cuentas, the Judge for civil matters, 
Marqués de la Plata, and the prosecutor for the Real Hacienda, Don Ángel Izquierdo, 
who brought forward the possibility of the King deciding over the resolution of the 
conflict. The King’s determination favored the RCP, strengthened Sarratea’s local 
position, and established a precedent for the privilege that the Company enjoyed.  
Future research will entail exploring the purchase-sale contracts that followed the 
introduction of the Company in order to identify its beneficiaries.  
It is already known that the costs of the failed company fell to the Royal 
Treasury (Real Hacienda), but the benefits were diluted in the commerce of the Río de 
la Plata. Perhaps this failure allowed the people of the Río de la Plata to remake their 
strategies and obtain the institutional grant of permits to become the new slave traders. 
They reaped the greatest benefits of the Crown’s bad business, as well as inaugurating a 
good project for future business in the following decade. Trafficking in the Río de la 
Plata experienced a new boom from 1790 until 1812. In fact, after the revolution of 
independence in Buenos Aires, the local merchants would leave the infamous commerce 
and turn to privateering with their Anglo-American partners, precisely against Spanish 
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